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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction over this appeal is properly reposed in the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2, a Writ of Certiorari having been granted by 
Order of the Court dated September 27, 2002. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTUES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The following statute as applied and interpreted in Utah decisional law is 
determinative of the issue on appeal. The text of the statute is presented, in its 
entirety, in the Addendum. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All references to numbered pages in the Trial Transcript (R. 141) hereafter 
cited as uTrial Tr. " 
1. In May of 2000, Respondent, at the urging of his attorney, 
approached several co-workers at Hill Air Force Base, and requested that they 
write a statement on Respondent's behalf in conjunction with an ex-parte 
protective order Respondent's estranged wife had filed. One such co-worker was 
Airman Jason Lyon ("Lyon"). (Trial Tr. 99.) 
2. Respondent asked Lyon to include in his statement whether 
Respondent had made threats against his estranged wife. (Trial Tr. 120-125.) 
3. Unbeknownst to Respondent, Lyon had, approximately one week 
before, provided a written statement to the Office of Special Investigations 
("OSI") of Hill Air Force Base wherein he stated, among other things, that he had 
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overheard Respondent make threats or speak threateningly against his estranged 
wife. {Trial Tr. 25-29.) 
4. Lyon testified that at no time did Respondent make any verbal or 
physical threats towards him nor did Respondent promise Lyon anything to induce 
him to write the statement. {Trial Tr. 56.) 
5. Lyon agreed to write a statement on behalf of Respondent without 
voicing any objection whatsoever. Subsequently, Lyon wrote a statement while he 
was alone at his dormitory. He later gave the statement to Respondent. {Trial Tr. 
33-34.) 
6. Lyon at no time told Respondent (1) about the OSI investigation; (2) 
that Lyon had previously provided a written statement to OSI; (3) that the 
statement which he had given to OSI was contrary to the statement he had given to 
Respondent; or (4) that Lyon did not believe what he had written. {Trial Tr. 123-
25.) 
7. Lyon did not inform his superior officers or any member of OSI that 
Respondent had asked for, and that he had provided him, a written statement. 
{Trial Tr. 42-43, 46.) 
8. Respondent provided Lyon's written statement to his attorney Pete 
Vlahos who subsequently submitted the same to the Second District Court in a 
protective order hearing. {Trial Tr. 100.) 
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9. Lyon pleaded guilty to giving a false written statement, a Class B 
Misdemeanor in exchange for his agreement to testify against Respondent. {Trial 
Tr. 51-52.) 
10. Respondent's trial counsel Richard J. Culbertson passed, without 
objection, the jury instructions which were ultimately given to the jury. {Trial Tr. 
135-142.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Manifest injustice occurred when the trial court failed to instruct the jury 
concerning the mental state or mens rea necessary to convict Respondent. On 
appeal, Respondent has never charged that the trial court's "elements" instruction 
(R-61) was erroneous. It tracks the language of the witness tampering statute as 
did the elements instruction proposed by Respondent. The error lies in the trial 
court's failure to give further instructions which set out the requisite mental state 
necessary to convict Respondent. That omission1 was in no way induced, nor 
invited by Respondent. 
ARGUMENT 
RESPONDENT DID NOT LEAD THE TRIAL COURT TO 
COMMITT INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR. THEREFORE, THE 
DOCTRINE OF "INVITED ERROR" IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS 
CASE. 
1
 This Court's Order of September 27, 2002, granted certiorari on the issue of 
whether "Defendant invited any instructional error where he proposed a jury 
instruction containing the very language he attacked on appeal". Petitioner has 
revised the issue, and rightly so, to address an omission rather than any erroneous 
language contained in a jury instruction. Respondent has raised no such attack on 
appeal. 
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The poml ol buMimim* loi ,in il\ sis oi (In issue picsriifal on appeal inn A 
be the uncontested findings of the Court of Appeals: (1) The Utah witness 
tampering statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508, does not specify a mens rea for the 
"attempt to indiiu' Humnl \hih \ deukgeuzian M P M1 MO <i M (I Hah 
2002); (2) Whereas the statutory iteration of the offense does not specify a 
culpable mental state, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 provides that u[I]ntent, 
knowledge, <u recklessness" shall s.ilish (he ///< US n a i ixji 11 renu i^il Id Mi 1 he 
trial court's instructions entirely omitted the required mental state. Id.; (4) I he 
failure to instruct on requisite mental state constitutes reversible error as a matter 
of law. Id., citing State vs. Chaney, 98l) F M 11 Ijy, Sec also Stale i s. 
Stringham, 957 F.2d 602 (Utah Ct. \pp 1998) and American Fork vs. Carr} 970 
P.2d 717, (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
A. Invited Error Must be Based on Some Affirmative \i I of a 
Defendant 
Absent a finding that Respondent invited the trial court's error, his 
conviction for witness tampering must be overturned to avoid manifest injustice, 
despite Respondent's failure to object to written in Inn In n> il In il I Hah 11. 
Crim. P., 19(e). Petitioner asserts that Respondent may not take advantage of the 
manifest injustice exception because he invited error. Petitioner's assertion of 
invited iiiui hinges sulciv on (In l,u 1 lli.il bh spomU n( ptupo »t (I <m i lements 
instruction at trial which accurately tracked the statutory elements, but did not 
address the mental state required for witness tampering. While true, that action 
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did not constitute an invitation to error under the doctrine developed b\ 11 Kill 
courl. Respondent's Inms^ression .tl worst, was one ol unwitting omission; 
Invited error is, by definition, a sin of commission. 
In one the earliest references to the interplay between invited error and 
Utah 1/ (MIII V l*)(ellhM ouil mSfaie v\ Medina M8 l> M III M, 1023 (Utah 
1987) noted that invited error occurred when Defendant's counsel "consciously 
chose not to assert any objection that might have been raised and affirmatively led 
the trial i out! lo believe lhal Iheir w is imllnn^ wiotip w illi Ihe mstiuetion" 
(emphasis added). Id., at 1023. In State vs. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1009 (Utah 
1996), this Court further explained that a Defendant "[CJannot lead the Court into 
error by failing to object ami Ihen lalei, when lie is di ^pleased w ilh Ihe ^ etdiet, 
profit by his actions," (citations omitted.) Id., at 1009. Finally, in State of Utah 
vs. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1293 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the Utah Court of 
Appeals refused to reverse a conviction statini" 11ial Ihe | impose ol Ihe imitul eimi 
doctrine is "[To] avoid permitting defendant to invite error and then implant it in 
the record as a form of appellate insurance against an adverse sentence." Id., at 
129.! W ithout question, invited error requires some conscious, affirmative ai(ion 
of the Defendant which leads the trial court to commit instructional error. In the 
present case, Respondent took no such action. 
The concept that invited error must be based on some alfiniialhe ac lion of 
tin* i )efendant nil her than an omission is borne out in Utah case law. The 
following is a survey of actions undertaken by defendants which have been held to 
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constitute invited error* In State vs. Medina, snpui ami auam in Siu »< i s 
Anderson, 929 V <i 1107 (Utah 1996) invited error was found when defense 
counsel at trial affirmatively represented to the trial court that a specific erroneous 
instruction was appropriate and unobjectionable Both t asi * distinguished (In 
coiidiiil IIOIII flinch irmaining silent. hiState vs. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991), a Defendant challenged two jury instructions on appeal which 
were proposed by the Defendant and given by the trial court In State vs Kmluk, 
957 1" M Id h( Haii t ( \pp. 1999), a Defendant raised an objection at trial, but 
failed to propose a curative instruction when specifically invited to do so by the 
trial court. In State vs Chaney, 989 P 2d 1091 (Utah Ct App 19W), a Detendant 
objected to an elements instil u lion }\\m li i mil inn <1 i \ mn t t mens iea 
requirement and then challenged the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on that 
element. Invited error was invoked in each of the cited cases, only on a showing 
thai tin D e l i miau l i l f m i u d w l\ d id MHIH linn*' lli il n i h i l at I I h< It i il < o m t mil 
occasioned the instructional error. 
The only Utah case which arguably addresses an omission in an instruction 
proposed h\ 1 k k itdanl is State vs. Stevenson, supra In 11 it t a\e lln Itiil unit's 
jury instruction in a rape case omitted the then statutory element that the victim 
and accused not be married. The Court rejected a challenge to the instruction 
because ttit utiiilkd i lunnil \\a an \ it tt issue in the case Ra an t all t \ fdaiee 
admitted at trial was that the parties were never married, the court found the 
omission to be harmless error. In dicta, the court indicated that the defendants' 
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proposed mens rea instruction, which likewise omitted the non mat i ntge eh incut, 
would also |it i'< ludi .M hallenge on the basis of invited error. In addition to the 
Stevenson case not being decided primarily on invited error, factual disparities 
distinguish it from the present case. While non-marriage was not at issue in llu 
Stevenson cusi. Iht menial state of Respondent was the lynch pin of the present 
case. Respondent's request for a written statement from Airman Lyon without any 
threat or inducement, on its face, did not constitute witness tampering. In order to 
convict Respondent Ihefim kid to k peisuaded Hi il Rrsj ondi itl lequested a 
statement which he knew Airman Lyons would believe to be false. Accordingly, 
Respondent's mental state was pivotal in the present case. 
Factually, oilier dtstitu lions i \ist bthuvti Stevenson \m\ ih« present case. 
In Stevenson, the instruction proposed by the defendant omitted one of the 
statutory elements of rape. By contrast, the statutory elements instruction 
proposed h\ Respondent in litis case, accm alek And i oinpletely set forth (lie 
statutory elements of witness tampering. In Stevenson, the omission of the non-
marriage element was apparently a conscious decision based on it not being an 
issue. In the present ease llu huhiu to instrui I on (In appiopiiate mental l tate, 
which is not included in the statute, appears to have been an oversight by 
prosecutor, defense counsel and trial court alike. 
/ 
!; Respondent did not Lead lllln Trinl < 'omi ( I/'jr " hv ri oposiii^ mi 
Elements Instruction. 
Respondent proposed a witness tampering elements instruction at trial 
which did nothing more than track the statutory elements found in fc /6-K-50X | K-
24). I ikew ise, Petitioner proposed a sin lilai elei nei its ii istr i iction w 1 licl 1 also 
tracked the statutory language of the witness tampering statute. (R-32). The trial 
court eventually adopted Instruction No. 29 which sets forth the pertinent statutory 
elen iei its in the context of the facts of the case. (R -61) Eacl I of tl le three \ ersions 
accurately describes the statutory elements of witness tampering. None of them 
include the requisite mental state for committing the crime which does not appear 
on the face of the stati ite. As far as they go, the insti i ictions are acci irate ai id not 
erroneous. Simply providing an accurate recitation of statutory elements of a 
crime cannot be an invitation to err. 
It" the Utah Rules of Criminal 1'ioeuliirc required (lul "the elements 
instruction" contain all of the statutory elements as well as the requisite mental 
state in a single integrated instruction, then Respondent's proposed jury instruction 
might be viewed as misleading the Irnil * omit 1 lowever., tl lere is no i equiremei it ii I 
Utah Law that the required mental state be coupled with the statutory elements in a 
single instruction. In practice, that likely happens when the requisite mental state 
is spelled out in the language of the stati ite W 1 iei I tl le elei i lent of Ii itent is i lot set 
forth in the statute, a separate instruction delineating intent is not uncommon. In 
State v. Larsen, 876 P2d 391, the Utah Court of Appeals acknowledges the 
8 
legitimacy of giving separate element instructions ami menial state instruelinm, 
even when the prerequisite mental state was included within the statutory 
elements: 
We believe that jury instructions No. 23 adequately instructed the 
jury on the elements of the theft.... Instruction No. 23 mirrored the 
language of the theft statute.... further, the other jury instructions 
adequately instructed the jury on the issue of intent... .Instruction 
No. 15 states the necessity of and defines "intent" as the mental state 
with which a person acts. 
Id, at 396. 
Given that Respoi ident was i lot required to include a mental state element 
together with the statutory element of witness tampering, than failure to do so is 
simply an omission to instruct on one of the essential facets of the case. That 
omission was i lot ai I affii i i lath • e act of the R espondei it. ' I 'he trial court did not 
invite Respondent to propose a mental state instruction as in Kiriluk, supra. The 
trial court did not query Respondent as to whether he objected to the failure to 
instri ict the ji ir> on niei ital state, nor did R espondent object to an insti i iction 
containing the proper mental state as in Chaney, supra. A comprehensive review 
of the record reveals simply that mental state was inadvertently overlooked and 
omitted from the it isti i lctioi i b> ti ial coi n t, prosecutoi , and defense coi insel I lie 
risk of the omission occurring emanated from the absence of the requisite mental 
state in the statute, not from any action of the Respondent. 
If a defendant w 1 10 fails to discover and repoi t ai i oi t lissioi i. ii I the jury 
instructions commits invited error, then the manifest injustice exception under 
Rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure ceases to exist. The position 
taken by Petitioner in this appeal would effectively transfer the burden of correctly 
instructing the jury from the trial court to the defendant. Simply remaining silent 
on an instruction, as did the defendant in State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 159 (Utah 1991), 
would constitute invited error and would preclude the defendant from thereafter 
appealing an erroneous instruction. If taking some affirmative action which 
misleads the court is excised from the doctrine of invited error, then a defendant 
would bear a higher burden than a prosecutor who's duty it is to prove each and 
every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501, 
and a higher burden than the trial court which bears the ultimate responsibility to 
instruct the jury correctly. State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981). 
Utah courts have consistently held that failure to instruct a jury on the 
culpable mental state required to commit a crime, by definition, is manifest 
injustice. State v. Chaney, supra; State v. Stringham, supra; and American Fork 
v. Carr, supra. That was never truer than in the present case where the facts 
elevate Respondent's mental state to the determinative issue before the jury. 
Where Respondent did nothing more than offer an element instruction which 
mirrored the statutory elements of witness tampering, it would be grossly unjust to 
deprive him of the opportunity for a fair trial before an adequately instructed jury. 
C. Petitioner Misreads the Decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Petitioner incorrectly interprets the decision of the Court of Appeals to 
mean that instructional error cannot be invited unless the Defendant also objected 
to a correct instruction (Pet'r.s Br. at 6). The actual rationale utilized by the Court 
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of Appeals to determine that Respondent did not invite error was that 
Respondent's conduct, did not affirmatively lead the trial court to commit error. 
"Here, the State has not shown that Defendant's (Geukgeuzian's) conduct actually 
led the trial court into its erroneous action. Thus, the invited error doctrine does 
not apply in this case." Geukgeuzian at 643. 
The Court of Appeals drew distinctions between the facts of the present 
case and the facts of Chaney, supra, because Petitioner was relying on Chaney as a 
case "on all fours" to establish invited error against Respondent. The Court of 
Appeals simply indicated that reliance to be unfounded because in that case the 
defendant successfully opposed a correct instruction which was ultimately not 
given by the court. In that case, the defendant's actions obviously affirmatively 
mislead the trial court. 
This Court may not reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the 
Defendant's conviction as requested in the Petitioner's Brief, without remanding 
the case to the Court of Appeals. (Pet'r.'s Br. at 12.) Based on its finding of 
manifest injustice, the Court of Appeals did not reach the issue of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on the charge of witness tampering. State vs. Geukgeuzian, 
(footnote 3). The issue of ineffective assistance had been fully briefed before the 
Court of Appeals. Petitioner now asks this Court to reject Respondent's 
ineffective assistance claims, without the benefit any briefing, exclusively on the 
strength of a footnote included in the Brief of Petitioner. (Pet'r.'s Br. at fn. 3). 
Under the circumstances, if this Court reverses the Court of Appeals' finding of 
11 
manifest injustice, the case must be remanded for a decision on the issue of 
ineffective assistance, which the Court of Appeals did not reach below. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should uphold the Court of Appeals' reversal of Respondents 
conviction for tampering with a witness. If this Court elects to reverse the 
decision of the Court of Appeals, the case should be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this 2% day of February, 2003. 
PETERSON REED & WARLAUMONT L.L.C. 
Kendall S. Peterson 
Attorney for Respondent 
12 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be sent by U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid to the following: 
J. Frederick Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM 
14 
Rule 19(e). Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions are 
given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions may be made after they are given 
to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The court shall 
provide an opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of the jury. Unless 
a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction 
may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice. In statig (sic) 
the objection the party shall identify the matter to whcih (sic) the objection is 
made and the ground of the objection matter to which he objects and the ground of 
his objection. 
15 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant of TAMPERING WITH 
A WITNESS as charged in the Information, you must find from the 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements 
of the crime: 
1. That on or about May 15, 2000, in Davis County, 
State of Utah; 
2. The defendant, Stephen L. Geukgeuzian, believing 
that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about 
to be instituted; 
3. Attempted to induce or other cause a person to: 
a. Testify or inform falsely; or 
b. Withhold any testimony, information, document, or 
item. 
If you find both of the above elements proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the defendant guilty; 
however, if the State has failed to prove any of the above 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to find the 
defendant not guilty. 
nnn24 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
In any criminal case, to establish the commission of any crime charged, the State must 
prove certain essential facts which the statutes of this State define as being the necessary 
elements constituting the crime charged. In the case before the court, proof of the commission 
of the crime of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, a Third Degree Felony, as charged in the 
Information requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following essential facts: 
1. If believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted, the defendant attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person to: 
a. Testify or inform falsely; 
b. Withhold any testimony, information, document, or item; 
c. Elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence, or 
d. Absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which he has been 
summoned. 
2. If the defendant: 
a. Commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by another as a 
witness or informant; 
b. Solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of his doing 
any of the acts specified under Subsection (1); or 
c. Communicates to a person a threat that a reasonable person would believe to 
be a threat to do bodily injury to the person, because of any act performed or to be performed by 
the person in his capacity as a witness or informant in an official proceeding or investigation. 
If you find the evidence has failed to prove any one or more of these essential elements 
to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, then it would be your duty to find the defendant 
not guilty of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, a Third Degree Felony, as charged in the 
Information. On the other hand, if you find from the evidence received during the trial that the 
State has proven each and every one of those essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it 
would be your duty to find the defendant guilty of the offense of TAMPERING WITH A 
WITNESS, a Third Degree Felony. 
INSTRUCTION NO 
Before you can convict defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, of TAMPERING WITH 
A WITNESS, as charged in Count 1 of the Information, you must find from the evidence beyond 
a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of the crime: 
1. That on or about May 15, 2000, in Davis County, State of Utah: 
2. The Defendant Stephen Lamar Geukguzian, believing that an official proceeding 
or investigation is pending or about to be instituted; 
3. Attempted to induce or other cause a person to: 
a. Testify or inform falsely; or 
b. Withhold any testimony, information, document, or item. 
If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, guilty of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, as 
charged in Count 1 of the Information. 
If, on the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are 
not convinced of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you must find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, not guilty of TAMPERING WITH A 
WITNESS, as charged in Count 1 of the Information. 
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